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Res Judicata in Administrative Law
“Justice begins where arbitrariness leaves off”; consistency has long 
been a hallmark of procedural justice in our system of law; there is no such 
similar stricture on administrative decision making. Since a great variety 
of administrative boards and tribunals are routinely expected to render 
both administrative and judicial decisions, the extent to which the rules of 
procedural justice apply is often called into question. For example, while 
the rule of res judicata  is fundamental to procedural justice in judicial de- 
cision-making, it can operate in a fashion contrary to ‘administrative’ de­
cision-making.
A res judicata  is a final judicial decision pronounced by a judicial tribunal 
having competent jurisdiction over both the cause or matter being litigated 
upon as well as over the parties to the litigation.1 The doctrine of res judicata 
constitutes one type of estoppel. In its early form, the doctrine seemed to 
be composed of two distinct branches.2 The first of these stated that a res 
judicata estopped or precluded any party to the litigation from afterwards 
disputing, as against any other party to it, the correctness of the decision 
in law or fact.3 The second branch prohibited the re-assertion of a cause 
of action in respect of which relief has already been granted by a judicial 
tribunal of competent jurisdiction.4 Modern authorities, however, do not 
appear to make the same distinction.5 Thus, res judicata  is now defined as 
a doctrine establishing merely that “the final judgm ent of a competent 
court may not be disputed, on the issue which it has settled, by the parties 
or their successors, in any subsequent legal proceeding”.6
Practitioners involved in administrative decision-making frequently face 
the problem of whether doctrines or rules of English Common Law ought 
to be incorporated into Administrative Law. The magnitude of the problem 
in respect to res judicata  prompted the f ollowing observation from no less 
an authority than S. A. deSmith:
'Bow er, The Doctrine o f  Res Judicata  (L ondon: B utterw orth  &: Co., 1924), at 17.
tlb id ., a t 3. Mr. Bower divides his treatise into two parts  entitled  “Estoppel by Res Jud icata" and  “Res 
Jud ica ta  as a Bar to Subsequent Recovery". Each part deals with a separate  b ranch ot the doctrine.
’Humphries v. H um phries, [1910] 2 K.B. 531 (C.A.).
i()utram  v. Morewood (1803), 3 East. 346; 102 E.R. 630 (K.B.).
’Indeed , som e judicial statem ents seem to suggest that to divide the  doctrine  into two branches confounds
two distinct ideas and  leads to a confusion with the  doctrine  o f  'm erger '; e.g., M cIntosh  v. Parent, [1924] 4
D.L.R. 420, at 422 (O nt. S.C.. A pp. Div.). See W ade. Adm inistrative ¡.aw  (4th ed.) (O xford: C larendon  Press.
1977),at 226-7.
bDias, Jurisprudence  (4th ed.) (L ondon: B utterw orth  & Co., 1976), at 45. See also Rex v. M anchuh oi M unchuk,
[1938] O.R. 385 (C.A.).
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It is difficult not to conclude that the concept o f  res judicata in administrative 
law is so nebulous as to occlude rather than clarify practical issues, and that it 
should be used as little as possible.7
There are two ways of approaching the problem of determining whether 
res judicata  applies to a decision of an administrative body. One would be 
to dissect the neat legal requirements for the application of the rule. I 
would call this the mechanical approach. The other aoproarh would be to 
look to the interest promoted by the rule and determine whether those 
interests ought to be similarly promoted in the field of administrative de­
cision making. This latter I would call the reasoned approach. We have 
examples of both approaches in our Canadian case law.
One of the more frequently cited authorities, that is an example of 
the mechanical approach, is also a good example o f the shortcomings of 
that approach in providing a guide in the application of res judicata  in 
administrative law. The case is Re Eernie M emorial H ospital Society and Duthie 8 
The decision in question was that of a Hospital Board reversing its own 
earlier decision not to dismiss a certain employee. The Supreme Court of 
British Columbia (affirmed on appeal) held that the principle of res judicata  
applied “only to a judicial decision pronounced by a judicial tribunal”.9 
The reasoned approach would undoubtedly lead to the same result but it 
may have resulted in a less categoric statement about the application of res 
judicata to the decisions of an administrative tribunal.
An equally ‘mechanical’ approach is ev ident in the numerous instances 
where administrative Boards have paid lip service to the principles of res 
judicata  but then have relied upon the exceptions to the rule so as to avoid 
its application. As these Boards are frequently asked to determine a variety 
of questions, the exception to the res judicata rule most commonly invoked 
is that ‘the issues are not the same’.
Labour Relations Boards provide a good example of the same or re­
lated matters being decided differently because of a difference in the pur­
poses for which they convene. Most Labour Relations Boards, in their 
administration of the collective bargaining system, have both the respon­
sibility for ascertaining the legality of a strike as well as the responsibility 
for deciding whether to grant consent to prosecute for (among other things) 
the conduct of an illegal strike. In the Alger Press Ltd. Case,'° the Ontario 
Labour Relations Board said that the ‘declaration’ of a strike’s illegality 
would not constitute res judicata in respect to a subsequent Board deter­
mination on whether or not to grant consent to prosecute. The Board’s
7deSm ith  .Ju d ic ia l Review  o f Adm inistrative Action (3d ed.) (L ondon: Stevens, 1973), at 94.
»(1963), 42 W.W.R. 511 (B.C.S.C.); a f f d  47 W.W.R. 120 (B.C. C.A.).
l0O nt. L.R.B. file No. 9204-64-U . D ecem ber, 1964.
■*42 W.W.R., at 512.
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reasoning, set out in an article written by J.F.W. Weatherill (the Board’s 
Deputy Vice-Chairman at the relevant time), was based on their having 
viewed the two processes as being different in nature." This is the very 
same approach that is taken to preclude the application of res judicata  in a 
criminal proceeding in regard to facts established in a previous civil action.12
Similar reasoning has been applied where an authority operating un­
der two or more different statutes makes apparently conflicting decisions, 
in Re Gloucester Properties Ltd. et al. And The Queen in Right o f British Columbia,™ 
the British Columbia Supreme Court held that the province’s Environment 
and Land Use Committee, acting under two separate statutes, was not 
bound by a decision made pursuant to one when contemplating the other 
since the two Acts imposed contrasting responsibilities.
The Privy Council has dealt with the application of the res judicata  
doctrine to the purely ‘administrative’ act of tax assessment on at least two 
occasions. In one case, it was said that res judicata  did not apply when the 
assessment was challenged in Court because the statute did not preclude 
the taxpayer’s right to do so. 14 In a more recent decision, the Privy Council 
held that res judicata  “cannot constitute an estoppel when a new issue of 
liability to a succeeding year’s rate or tax comes up for adjudication”.15 The 
question as to whether a tax assessment decision ought to be protected by 
the principle of res judicata does not appear to have been considered in 
either o f these cases.
The Supreme Court of Canada, in refusing to apply the res judicata 
rule to a decision of the Tariff Board classifying products under the Customs 
Act, did not venture to say that the rule was inappropriate but merely looked 
to the rule’s exceptions to find the means of avoiding its’ application.16
Earlier decisions dealing with the application of res judicata  to a judge’s 
‘discretionary’ power to issue prerogative writs appear to support the prop­
osition that it is not the nature of the tribunal but the nature of the decision 
being made that is important. In Grand Junction and M idland Railways of 
Canada v. Corporation o f Peterborough, the Privy Council said that “the refusal 
of the prerogative writ of mandamus cannot be pleaded as res judicata  in
"J.F .W . W eatherill. “Res Judicata in an Adm inistrative T ribunal". (1965) 4 W estern O nt. I.. Rev. 113 at 
119-20.
l2See Re Dineen Roads C7 Bridges Ltd. and U nited Brotherhood o f Carpenters and Joinders of America et. al. (1975). 
HO D.L.R. (3d) 86 (Ont. H .C., Div. Ct.).
>»(1980), 116 D.L.R (3d) 596 (S.C.C.).
liBennetl and White (Calgary) Ltd. v. M unicipal District of Sugar City No. 5, [ 1951] A.C. 786 (P.C.) (Alta.).
^Society o f  Medical Officers of H ealth v. Hope (Valuation Officer), [1960| A.C. 551 (H .L .(L )); see also Caffoor
v. Income Tax Commissioner, [1961] A.C. 584 (P.C.) (Ceylon).
l6Javex Co. Ltd. et. al. v. Oppenheimer et al, [1961] S.C.R. 170; 26 D.L.R. (2d) 523 (S.C.C.).
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bar of (the present) suit; because first the jurisdiction exercised in such a 
refusal is a discretionary jurisdiction.”17
On this point the dissenting opinion of Martland J. (Laskin C.J.C., 
concurring) in Grillas v. M inister o f M anpower and Imm igration18 is of parti­
cular interest. Mr. Justice Martland found that the Immigration Appeal 
Board’s power to review a decision was an “equitable” jurisdiction of a 
continuing nature exercisable at the Board’s discretion and hence, res ju ­
dicata was not applicable.19 Mr. Justice Pigeon, in a separate judgm ent 
concurring with the majority result, cited The City o f Jonquiere v. M unger20 
as authority for the principle that “decisions made by a board established 
under a statute pertaining to the exercise of an administrative jurisdiction 
(are final).21 However, Mr. Justice Pigeon did not characterize the matter 
as one involving the application of res judicata. Moreover, the ‘Jonquiere’ 
case dealt with the jurisdiction of an arbitral board to vary its award and 
not with the principle of res judicata.
There are a number of cases in which, like ‘Jonquiere’, the issue is 
characterized as a ‘jurisdictional question’ rather than one of the applica­
bility o c res judicata.'2'2 The distinction apparently depends upon whether a 
Board undertakes to actually re-open a matter, which raises a jurisdictional 
question,23 or whether it simply entertains a second application in regard 
to the same matter, which raises the issue of res judicata.21* Wade explains 
the issue in this fashion:
Res judicata is sometimes confused, with the principle o f finality o f  statutory 
decisions and acts, and thus with the general theory o f judicial control. If a public 
authority has statutory power to determine some question, for example, the 
compensation payable to an employee for loss o f office, its decision once made 
is normalv final and irrevocable. This is not because the authority and the em ­
ployee are estopped from disputing it, but because, as explained elsewhere, the 
authority has power to decide only once and thereafter is without jurisdiction 
in the case. Conversely, where a statutory authority determines some matter 
within its jurisdiction, its determination is binding not because o f any estoppel 
but because it is a valid exercise o f statutory power.25
I7(1887), 13 A.C. 136 at 142 (P.C.) (per Lord H obhouse) (O nt.); see also Canaday's Apparel Ltd. v. Ross et 
al (1959), 30 W.W.R. 697 (Sask. Q.B.).
,8[1972] S C R  577, 23 D.L.R. (3d) I (S.C.C.).
'»[1972) S.C.R. at 590.
*°[ 1964] S.C.R. 45.
2*Supra. footnote  19, at 592.
Tie.g., Canadian Industries Ltd. v. Development Appeal board  «/ Edmonton and M adison Development Corporation 
L td  (1969), 71 W .W.R. 635 (Alla. S.C.); Lambert v. Alberta Teachers Assoc., (1978] 6  W.W.R. 184 (Alla. S.C., 
T .n .) .
2,e.g.. The City of jonquiere v. M unger, supra  footnote 20; Canadian Industries L td .. supra, foo tno te  22.
2,e.g.. Zorba's Food Service Ltd. v. City of Edmonton  (1970), 74 W.W.R. 218 (Alta. S.C., Appl. I)iv ).
-’"’Wade, supra, footnote 5, at 227.
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In a case where the issue was whether a Development Appeal Board 
could issue a permit concerning the use of a building which conflicted with 
a condition or an earlier permit, Mr. Justice Johnson of the Supreme Court 
of Alberta said:
This leads to the second argument, which is that the Board’s original order and 
the conditions which were attached to its operation were akin to a judgment of 
a court o f  law and the matter was now res judicata. The res judicata (sic) cannot, 
o f  course, apply to these orders because they are not orders o f a court. The rule 
that orders o f  administrative boards which arrive at their decisions by apply ing 
judicial or quasi-judicial procedures are given such finality that they cannot be 
altered or appealed is akin to res judicata. To determine if the original order o f  
the Development Appeal Board was that kind o f order it is necessary to deter­
mine whether the procedure for the application, including the hearing o f  the 
appeal, is quasi-judicial or is merely an administrative procedure, for if it is 
merely the latter, the rule has no application: de Smith, judicial review o f  Ad­
ministrative Action, 2nd ed., p. 9 1.26
The reliance of the Alberta Court on the administrative/judicial di­
chotomy to solve the problem of whether res judicata  applied and its ref­
erence to the second edition of de S‘ .h as authority is worth noting 
because, in a later edition. Professor de Smith wrote in regard to this very 
matter:
Never the less some o f  these propositions are deficient in recent authoritative 
support. In particular the dichotomy o f  judicial and non-judicial acts has not 
been regularly reaffirmed in the case law. No attempt yet made to reconstruct 
this area o f administrative law has carried conviction, though the difficulties 
inherent in the conceptual reasoning have been skillfully exposed .-7
Similarly, Professor Wade refers to the attempt to distinguish admin­
istrative from judicial decisions in the application of res judicata as another 
example of “that favourite fallacy”.28
Perhaps what is needed is an approach to the problem that more closely 
examines the common law rationale for the res judicata principle and whether 
the same rationale should apply in bestowing finality on the determination 
of any particular issue by a statutory decision-maker. There have been 
some efforts made in this direction by Labour Relations Boards and ar­
bitrators, in particular, determining whether res judicata  applies to their 
own previous decisions.
The reasons for the res judicata  rule have been simply put:
26Supra, footnote 24. at 220 (per Johnson ).A.).
27Supra, footnote 7, at 93.
n Supra, footnote 25, at 230.
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They depend on, 1, Public Policy, it being in the interest o f the state that there 
should be an end o f litigation: Interest ret publicae ui sit finis litium and 2, the 
hardship to the individual that he should be twice vexed for the same cause:
Nemo vexari pro eodem causa.29
One need not look long or hard to come up with all sorts of administrative 
board decisions that, on the aforementioned grounds of utility and equity, 
simply ought not to be final. Indeed, there were allusions to this fact in Re 
Zorba's Food Services Ltd. v. City of Edmonton30 where the Court suggested 
that to have imposed res judicata  on the Development Appeal Board’s de­
cisions would have resulted in individual hardship and would, as well, have 
been counter to community interest. It seems to be equally clear that to not 
impose res judicata on the arbitration of a group of employees’ wages would 
be counter to both public interest and individual equitv.
The Ontario Labour Relations Board has had considerable opportunity 
to grapple with the issue of res judicata. They have adopted the approach 
of disavowing its applicability (while at the same time citing its virtues) and 
applying a doctrine “akin to res judicata in a variety o f circumstances”.’1 
The Board’s comments when applying the doctrine in Ontario Nurses As­
sociation v. Oakwood Park Lodge are typical:
Although the Act does not expressly authorize the application o f the doctrine 
o f res judicata, there jre strong practical and policy grounds for doing so. Rights 
and duties have meaning only if they are certain and relatively stable. Parties 
expect that a decision o f  the Board will clarify their legal relationship and put 
an end to the controversy between them. Board decisions would lose much of 
their value if they did not provide a reliable guide for the conduct or planning 
o f  the parties affairs. Continuous litigation would undermine the harmonious 
relationship between the parties which the Act is designed to foster, and could 
give rise to abuse and harassment o f  a weaker party. It could also give rise to 
costly duplication, inefficient utilization of the Board’s scarce resources, and a 
serious impediment to the effective administration o f the Act. This potential 
consequence is especially serious in labour relations matters where “time is the 
essence" and finality is an important statutory objective.
At issue in the case was the status of persons as “employees” under the 
Act, an issue in which finality is probably a desirable objective. Some Labour 
Relations Board decisions, however, involve far broader questions of public 
interest and affect persons to a far less permanent degree. The New Bruns­
wick Public Service Labour Relations Board, for example, has refused to 
apply the principle in its decisions designating essential employees prohib­
ited from striking, a function which by statute the Board must perform in 
each successive round of negotiations.33
w P ukford  v. Dales (1957). 7 D.L.R. (2d) 600. at 604 (pet Doull |.) (NSSC): s i r  also B tm ci, supra loo tnotc
1. at 4 and  176-7.
‘"(1970). 12 D.L.R. (3d) 618.
■"Ontario N u n es  Association v. O akuvod Park Lodge, 11980] <) I. R B Rep. 1501, at 1504.
'■Ibid.. at 1503.
" I n  the m atte r ol an A pplication t 'l id e r  s. 50 for D esignation in a D ispute Involving Treasury B oard and 
New Brunswick Council of S ihool B oard Unions. Jan. 12. 1982 (N.B.P.S. L.R.B.).
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Dr. Wade advocates the reconciliation of the fundamental idea of sta­
tutory decision-making with the concept of res judicata, as opposed to simply 
discarding it. He points out that statutory decision-makers have a “statutory 
public duty to make correct (decisions) on each occasion, and that no es­
toppel can avail to prevent them from doing so”.S4 He further points out 
that it is contrary to public interest to bind public authorities to wrong 
decisions by the mechanical applicaton of res judicata. According to Pro­
fessor Wade, it is this very different dimension of public interest in the 
area of statutory decision-making authority that distinguishes it from the 
adjudication of private rights, and which makes res judicata, another prin­
ciple of public interest, inapplicable. Dr. Wade, while admitting some scope 
for the application of res judicata to administrative decision, states:
A large class o f administrative cases must also be rules out because they involve 
public policy. . . .  As will be seen the discretionary power o f a public authority 
cannot normally be fettered, even by its own decisions. Res judicata rests on the 
theory o f  an unchanging law, whereas policy must be free to change at any 
moment, as the public interest may require.55
Such a formulation of the principal underlying the application of res 
judicata to administrative decisions offers both some coherence and a ra­
tional explanation. Certainly, it is also consistent with the often unstated 
philosophy in most of the recent decisions. In addition, it would appear to 
be in conformity with those decisions which have held that res judicata does 
not apply to the ‘discretionary’ authority of judicial bodies.
On several occasions recently, Courts have refused to apply the doc­
trine of res judicata  to those decisions of statutory tribunals which have a 
broad public impact. As examples, one could list a rate amendment decision 
for Bell Canada by the Canadian Transport Commission,-10 a decision by 
an Agricultural Land Commission37 and the decision of a professional gov­
erning body regarding charges of negligence against one of its’ members. ’8 
Although the latter case substantially involved an individual’s right, it was 
overshadowed by the public responsibility of a self-governing professional 
body and was thus, conceptually different from those cases involving private 
arbitration of an employee’s rights where res judicata is often applied.
On the other hand, in a case where the Ontario Labour Relations Board 
was dealing with the same parties in an application to certify a union under 
section 8 of the Ontario Act, adjudicated on by the Board in a previous 
application involving unfair labour practices, the Ontario Division Court 
said:
56Centre fo r  Public Interest Law  v. Canadian Transport Commission and Bell Canada. [1974] 1, S.C.R. at 276.
^R eg in a  v. Association o f Professional Engineers o f Saskatchewan. E x  Parte Johnston  (1968), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 588 
(Sask. C.A.).
u Supra, footnote 25, at 231.
iblbid , at 236.
57Supra, footnote 13.
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The Act is a code designed to resolve volatile labour disputes quickly and rel­
atively inexpensively. T o apply, as the Board did here, the doctrine o f  res judicata 
in a limited wav, appears to be proper and commendable. T o give effect to the 
applicant's contention (that the question o f a contravention o f the Act had to be 
relitigated) would fly in the face o f the intent o f  the legislation.**
In trying to decide whether or not to impose the principles of res judicata  
on an arbitration tribunal established pursuant to labour legislation and a 
collective agreement, Mr. Justice Monnin of the Manitoba Court of Appeal 
held, in a dissenting opinion, that it was a principle “reserved for the court 
rooms”.40 Noting both of the legislators preferences for methods to solve 
labour disputes that avoid the rigidity and time-consuming features of the 
court room as well as the complexity of the issue of res judicata, Mr. Justice 
Monnin came to the conclusion that it was not a principle which would 
further the interest of the parties in the system.
The Arbitrators, themselves, have displayed considerable ingenuity in 
coming to grips with this issue. For example, in the case of Wicket and 
C raig41 Professor Arthurs was able to save the baby even while throwing 
out the bathwater by distinguishing betwen the “persuasive” as opposed to 
the “preclusive” effect of a previous decision. Although he did not consider 
himself legally bound to follow an earlier decision, Professor Arthurs said:
Thus, in considering the effect to be accorded an earlier award between the 
same parties . . .  a second arbitrator considers both its reasoning and its expected 
precedential role, and may be so overwhelmed by the combined weight o f  both 
factors that he is persuaded to defer to it even though he would not have done  
so were he to consider its reasoning along.'*
I he dilemma that res judicata poses to the arbitrator with a jurisdiction to 
exercise is put very well by Professor Kuttner in R e Desire Robichaud:4:’
Although it has long been established that the doctrine o f res judicata is not 
integral to the system of grievance arbitration, to deny the overriding persuasive 
force o f previous decisions made in similar facts circumstances calling for the 
interpretation o f the same collective agreement would wholly undermine those 
values universally accepted as essential to any rational system o f  third party 
dispute resolution: certainty, uniformity, stability and predictability. O f course, 
neither justice nor equity is to be sacrificed to these values and an arbitrator is 
statutorily bound to adjudicate the dispute before him on its merits. In ^ e d , to 
do otherwise, and blindly adopt the reasons for decisions given in a t revious 
dispute could arguably be viewed as a declining o f jurisdiction."
,9T andy  Electronics Ltd. and  C om m ercial W orkers U nion, Local 832, 80 CLLC 14, at 216 (per C orey ).).
v'Re M anitoba Food L’nton id  Commercial Workers I ’w on. Local S3 2  and Canada Sajeu'as Lid. (1981), 120 D.L.R. 
(3d) 42 (Man. C.A.).
"R e  Amalgamated M eal (Miters, Local I2 5 L , and Wicket and Craig Lid. (1963). 13 LAB ARB. CAS. 363 (() L 
R B ).
v2lbid., at 365.
,sRe Desire R obichaud, u n rep o rted  decision u n d er Public Service l-al>our Relations Act RSNB 1973 — 
hied Julv, 1981.
"Ibid.. at 14.
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Considerable guidance for arbitrators dealing with this issue has been 
provided in an early authoritative comment by j .  F. W. Weatherill43 which 
is, in fact, frequently cited with approval by arbitrators.4b
T he theme that remains constant in all the authorities is that one must 
look to the jurisdiction set out in the statutory authority to answer the 
question of whether the Board can consider the matter before it and no 
estoppel can be raised to prevent a statutory authority from exercising its 
jurisdiction.47 The use o f the distinction of whether the board or tribunal 
is a court or a statutory tribunal, as a basis for determining whether res 
judicata  applies, does not appear to have received overwhelming acceptance. 
Similarly, the question of whether or not the decision-maker is rendering 
a judicial or administrative decision does not appear to have been generally 
accepted as the basis for determining whether or not the res judicata rule 
should apply.
A review of the authorities leaves the impression that what one must 
do is examine very carefully the statutory power under which a decision­
maker is operating in order to determine whether or not it was ever in­
tended that the jurisdiction exercised by that Board was one in which an 
estoppel ought to have applied. This requires a clear understanding of the 
interest of the parties and the public interest in the decision-making process 
coupled with a consideration of whether those interests are furthered by 
the application o f the principle of res judicata tx> the decisions made bv 'hat 
board or tribunal. The justice that is promoted by the application of the 
res judicata  principle to judicial decisions (of the courts) is not absolute. It 
would, therefore, be a mistake to assume that justice would be done in all 
cases by the application of the rule of res judicata to the judicial or admin­
istrative decisions made by boards or tribunals acting under a statutory 
authority. Clearly, there are situations where justice is served by imposing 
on a decision-maker some degree of consistency. Just as clearly, however, 
there are many types and instances of decision-making where justice would 
not be served by imposing on the system the rigidity inherent in the prin­
ciple of res judicata. Having recognized this, I think it is safe to say that it 
is always preferable to address the fundamental question of whether or 
not res judicata applies, rather than attempt to make use of the exclusionary 
rules accompanying res judicata  to avoid its application in those instances 
where it would be inconvenient.
DOUGLAS C. STANLEY*
45J.F .W . W eatherill, “T h e  B inding Force o f A rbitration  A wards” (1958), 8 LAB ARB. CAS. 323. This 
article also deals with stare decisis and  its application to arb itral ju risprudence.
ibe.g. Re Phillips Cables and  Lim ited Electrical. Radio and M achine Workers. Local 510  (1978). lti L.A.C. (2d) 
225 (O.L.R. B.). This decision is. in itself, an excellent survey o f the ju risprudence.
*B.B.A., LL.B. (U .N .B .), LL.M . (York). Senior p a rtn e r, Stanley and  Levesque. Fredericton, New Bt unsvt it k
47Gi// v. R  (1978), 88 D.L.R. (3d) 341 (F ).
